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I. Performance During the Second Plan 
Prior to 19S0 Pakistan's economic performance was 
notably poor. During the Second Five Year Plan period 
(1960-65)3 however., considerable progress was achieved. All 
the major targets were exceeded: GNP was expected to grow 
2k per cent over the period:; government data show that it 
grew 29 per cent. Per capita income was expected to increase 
by 10 per cent: it appears that in fact- it grew 13 percent. 
The most surprising features of Pakistan's development during 
the last five years were the high rate of growth of exports 
and the breakthrough achieved in agriculture. Foreign exchange 
earnings were expected to grow by only 15 per cent over the 
periodj, whereas they actually grew 'i0 per cent. Agricultural 
output had only increased by 7 per cent during the First 
Plan and it was hoped that the rate would nearly double during 
the Second; in facts agricultural output is reported to have 
increased by 19 per cent. In contrasts the over-achievement 
in industry—though impressive—was somewhat less. A '4-7 per 
cent increase in output was projected for the sector and a 
51 per cent increase was achieved. 
There were. of course^ short-falls in few sub-sectors. 
A sample of the more important difficiencies might include 
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the following: Only half the "budget allocated to family 
planning was spent3 exports of cotton manufactures were 
Rs. 250 million less than projected; output of cement at the 
end of the plen period was 2.4 million tons less than the 
4.0 million ton target; only 200 of the modest projection 
of 320 rural health centers were established. These defi-
ciencies.. viewed either separately or together, are not 
particularly serious and can be corrected rather easily. 
Worries about Pakistan's past growth performance., and her 
ability to sustain ita center on other issues. 
The abo.e-target achievements for exports can largely 
be attributed to three items: raw cotton, miscellaneous 
exportsand invisibles. The latter was nearly as important 
as the first two combined. What will happen to invisible 
earnings during the next five years is uncertain. It is known, 
however, that emigrants' remittances from the U.K. represent 
a large component of total invisibles and they have been 
growing rapidly. It is also known that Britain has recently 
tightened her controls over immigration. One might reason-
able expect, therefore; that in the future the growth rate 
of remittances will be lower. What will happen to miscella-
neous exports is completely unknotm. 
The interpretation of the recent expert performance 
of raw cotton depends upon the time perspective one adopts. 
Experts of raw cotton in 1964-55 were about 20 per cent 
lower than exports a decade earlier. On the other hand 
cotton exports increased dramatically beginning in 1932-63. 
If one projects, the recent experience; the future looks quite 
promising; if one projects the experience of a decade, it 
looks less promising. 
The behavior of exports of raw cotton appears to be the 
result of two conflicting trends. Until 19S0-;>1 cotton pro-
3 
duQtJ.cn in West Pakistan was stagnant* at the same time do-
mestic consumption, of cotton by the new textile industry grew 
•rapidly.. As a consequence t e volume of cotton available for 
export diminished. More recentl a however, cotton output has 
increased and the rate of growth of domestic consumption has 
been reduced. This has led to a sharp rise in the exports 
of.raw.cotton. Whether the recent export performance can be 
sustained depends upon whether these two trends continue. 
During the four years from 19S0-S1 to 1963-0^ output of 
crops grown primarily in West Pakistan rose quite sharply. 
Cotton production increased 20 percent,, wheat output in-
creased CA'r percent and sugarcane production increased 26.5 
per cent.- The major explanation for this growth lies in the 
substantial increase in private investment in tubewell irri-
gation and the use of fertilizers in this province. Agricultural 
performance in East Pakistan- in contrast, is rather puzzling. 
Jute output declined by 1.7 per cent, while rice output is 
believed to have increased by 27.5 per cent. There were no 
dramatic changes in the area cultivated; the major increase 
in rice output is attributed to rising yields—which reportedly 
increased 36 per cent between 1957 and 1954. Yet we know that 
the use of "unconventional"-inputs did not rise very much. Thus 
it is quite possible that cut-put oi foodgrains in East Pakistan 
lias been overstated. Since rice output represents over a 
quarter of East Pakistan's gross product . a slight overstate-
ment would be serious. Such an overstatement would imply that 
the true rates o:. growth of East Pakistan's income and the 
GNP are lower than are reported, and the per capita income 
disparity between the two wings is wider. 
II. Overall Strategy During the Third Plan 
a,) Growth targets 
The gro.th strategy of the Third Plan is tc build upon 
the success achieved during the Second and to accelerate 
further the rate of expansion of national output. It is antici 
pated that thz annual average compound rate of growth of GNP 
will increase from 5.2 per cent to 5.5 per cent. The trend 
rate of growth at the end of the Second Plan is believed to 
have been 5-7 per cent., so that.*, in effect, the strategy over 
the next five years is to increase this instantaneous rate by 
14 percent to the projected average. As shorn in Table 
this.is to be accomplished by accelerating expansion in each 
major sector. 
TABLE I 
ACHIEVED AMD ANTICIPATED SECTORAL GROWTH RATES 
(annual compound percentage rate of growth) 
Second Plan 
(achievement 
Third Plan 
(target) 
G.N. P. 5.2 5.5 
Agriculture 3.5 5.0 
Industry P, f <J . o 10.0 
Services 5.7 7.1 
Exports 7.0 9.5 
Income per capita 2.5 3.8 
Source: Third Five Year Plan 
Each of the sector targets will be considered in more 
detail below. It should be pointed cut here, that the success 
of the Plan will depend in large measure upon whether Pakis-
tan (!) is able to induce a sharp acceleration in the rate of 
increase of agricultural output3 and (ii) is able to sell a 
rapidly growing proportion of her domestic output aborad. The 
Plan requires an increase of 43 and 35 percent in the rat 
of growth of agricultural output and exports respectively, 
b) Domestic savings •3 V\ 
Gross domestic saving as a percentage of GUP appears to 
have increased: the proportion was 6.0 per cent in 1954-55* 
it fell to 5.9 per cent in 1952-oO; hut by 1964-65 it had 
risen again to 9.5 per cent. The intention of the Third Plan 
is to further increase the ration to 13.5 per cent by 1969-
70. To do this a marginal savings rate of .22 has been pro-
jected. This national aggregate appears to be a v/eighted 
average of essentially two major elements. First5 the Plan 
informs us that large-scale industry "was savin and re-
„ 1/ 
investing nearly 75 percent of its profits . There is very 
little evidence for this assertion but it appears to be an 
important assumption • . underlying the plan strategy. Seccndl 
We are told that "the Government•s marginal rate of saving 
from its revenue will be over 4-0 oer cent/1 and that "revenues * 2/ 
are expected to rise by 70 per cent." 
Let us conside the assumptions about public savings 
first,. The present ratio of government receipts to national 
income is 1-1 per cent. The projections of growth rates of 
revenue (70 per cent) and GUP (38 per cent) over the plan 
period imply that the marginal propensity to tax (including 3/ 
tax changes) is 20.3 per cent. • They also imply that the 
ratio of government receipts to GHP will be 13.55 per cent in 
1969-70. The plan chapter on "Resources and Financing", how-
ever. states that even if all proposed additional taxation is 
imposed government, revenues will only be 13 per cent of GNP 
at that date. Thus it is quite likely that public savings will 
be somewhat lower than is expected—even if the marginal pro-
pensity to save out of taxes is 40 per cent and the contem-
plated additional taxes are in fact levied. 
The assumption included in the plan suggest that 8.1 
percentage -points of the 22 per cent marginal savings rate V 
will be generated in the public sector. The remaining 13*9 
per cent must come from private savings. It is known, however, 
that private non-corporate savings have shown no tendency 5/ whatever to increase. This means that the increased private 
— — 
savings are expected to come from the'1, corporate sector* and 
especially large-scale industry. 
There is very little reliable information as to the 
share of profits of large-scale industry in national income. 
The national accounts,, however indicate that value added in 
this sub-sector represents about 7.2 per cent of GNP. The 
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission claims that the 
share of wages in the total income of industry is 30 per c / w 
cent. Let us assume, therefore that profits account for the 
remainder, i.e. for 70 per cent. This means that at most the 
profits of large-scale manufacturing are 5.04 per cent of 
GKP (=7.2 x .70). If we assume (a) this ratio remains roughly 
constant during the next five years and (b) that 75 per cent 
of these profits are saved., the maximum contribution toward 
raising the marginal rate of savings to the required level that 
can come from this sector is 3.0 percentage points (=5'.0^ !".x 
.75). The remaining 10.1 percentage points must come primarily 
from the agricultural and services section. 
Following the same procedure as before, we learn from 
the national accounts that agriculture and services represent 
49.1 and 40 per cent respectively of GNP. Let us assume, in 
accordance with Said Hasan's hint, that the share of profits V 
ill the two sectors Is 20 and 50 per cent respectively. 
Then the combined profits from agriculture and se "vices must 
represent nearly 30 per cent of" GNP (49.Ix.20+40x.50 = 29-82). 
Again assuming this ratio remains roughly constant during 
the next five years, over a third of the profits generated 
in these two sectors will have to be saved In order to meet 
the marginal savings target. (10.1/29.82 = 3 3 . I t is 
unlikely that such a high rate can be achieved under present 
conditions. 
Thus it appears to us that the projections of domestic 
savings are overly optimistic, (i) It Is unlikely that the 
total elasticity of the tax system will be as high as 1.9. 
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:(ii) It is - .unlikely that the marginal rate of savings out of 
corporate profits will be .75. (iii) In viaw of the poverty 
in'most of the agricultural and services sectors and the low 
"incentives-;'provided. them,:, it is unlikely that the marginal 
rate of savings, out of profits will approach.34 in these 
sectors. 
c) Income dlstrlbution 
The distribution of income has been a major ingredient o:;' 
the strategy for economic development in Pakistan. The plan-
ners believe "it is clear that the distribution of national 
product in the Third Plan should be such as to favour the 
savin .sectors". In practice this h<°.s meant , that policies 
redistributing income from, the rural to the urban areas> from 
agriculture to industry have been favoured. It has been 
argued elsewhere that per capita consumption and. income in 
rural areas are no higher today then they were in 1349-50, 
although the latter rose quite rapidly during the last five 
2/ 
years. 
A large part of the increase:,in per capita income -has 
been channeled to the urban areas.yvand particularly to the 
upper income groups. The bottom 5 pe: cent, and even the lower 
45 -P-rr cent, , of the urban population have incomes substantially 
below the equivalent ^ groups . in. the rural sectors of both East 10/ 
and Tiest Pakistan.. The top-5 per cent of the population in 
Karachi haVe-ah income 27 times highr than the bottom 5- per 
cent, and nearly 7 times higher than the national average. 
- In spite of this extremely skewed "distribution private 
savings remain quite low. 
It is, in fact, a common fallacy to suppose that an. un-
equal distribution of income.automatically leads to a high 
savings rate. It is quite as likely to lead simply to an 
unequal distribution of consumption. Moreover, even if income 
inequality leads to high rates of capital accumulation, there 
is no guarantee that the composition of this.investment will 
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reflect social priorities. The opposite is likely to he true: 
investment will be directed intp projects which yield the 
highest profits. Monetary returns, however3 will depend upon 
the level and composition of demand, which in turn depends 
upon the distribution of income. Hence investment is likely 
to be undertaken to produce goods consumed mostly by wealthier 
groups of the nation, e.g. luxury houses, cosmetics and per-
fumes. consumer durables. The level of savings and the compo-
sition of investment can best be determined not by the crude 
device of redistributing income but by using the government's 
control system (e.g. fiscal policy, direct investment, price 
incentives) to induce and compel the disired response. With 
proper management there need be no conflict between growth and 
equity. 
III. Sector Targets. 
a) The Allocation of investment 
Despite the modest domestic savings performance, the 
level of investment has been increasing rapidly over the last 
15 years, principally as a result of the large inflows of 
foreign aid. Total development expenditure in the Third Plan 
is to be Rs. 52,000 million, or an average of Rs.10,400 million 
per annum. By the end of the Third Plan the investment: GNP 
ratio is expected to rise to 20.2 per cent. 
TABLE II 
THE LEVEL AND RATE OF INVESTMENT 
(Rs.million) 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-5® 1964-65 Average of Third Plan 
Public 
Investment 310 610 1710 3070 6,000 
Private 
Investment 810 1590 1720 3320 4,400 
Total 
Investment 
a 
1120 2200 3430 6390 10,400 
Public In-
vestment as 
percentage of 
Total investment 28 28 50 48 58 
TABLE II (Cont'd) 
1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1954-65 Average of Third Plan 
Gross Investment b 
as percentage 4.6 7-.9 10.9 15.0 20.2 
of GNP 
Source: Third Five Year Plan, pp. 4-5; 19^-0. 
a 
Excludes investment in Indus Basin Works 
b 
1970 
It can be seen in Table II above that public investment, 
although starting at a very low level, has increased consi-
derably faster than private investment. As a result by 1970 
the share of public investment in the total will have increased 
from less than thirty percent to nearly sixty percent.. Had pub-
lic investment maintained its original relationship to private 
investment, the projected development program and rate of 
growth in the Third Plan would have been approximately 40 
per cent lower. The high rate of growth of public investment 
has been, and will continue to be, a major factor In acce-
lerating Pakistan's overall rate'of" development. 
The allocation of investment among the major sectors f 
has varied considerably from one period to another. Data for 
the three Five Year Plans, as well as the pre-plan period 
(1950-55), are presented in Table III. 
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TABLE III 
.THE ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT 
1950-51 1955-60 1960-55 1965-70 
Agriculture 6 7 13 15 
Water and power . 1 3 17 19 15 
Industry, fuel and 36 31 28 26 
minerals 
Transportation and 14 17 17 18 
Communicant ion 
Physical planning 
and housing " 22 20 15 13 
Education ' 5 6 4 5 
Health 3 2 1 2 
Social welfare and manpower 1 - neg. 1 
Public works pro-
gramme - - 3 5 
Source: Third Five Year Plan, p.48 
Housing and industry, the two sectors which are dominated 
by private investment, have declined steadily in relative im-
portance. This is consistent with cur ea.rlier analysis of the * 
trends In public and private investment. It does not imply, of 
course, that the absolute expenditure in these two categories 
is declining. 
The proportionate expenditure on water and power will 
fall by over 20 percent in the Third Plan, while the alloca-
tion to transportation and communication will increase slightly, 
The net effect will be an 8 per cent fall in the relative ex-
penditure on social overhead capital. As the productivity of 
investment In this sector is fairly low, the relative decline 
is welcome. 
Most encouraging has been the steady increase in the 
share of development expenditure going to agriculture. The 
Third Plan has allocated 15 percent of investment to this 
sector. Although this is a. relatively low proportion, it re-
presents a 114 per cent increase over the First Plan alloca-
tion. Moreover, beginning in the last half of the Second 
Plan, a fairly substantial public works programme was begun. 
The object of this cheme is to mobilize the unemployed by 
putting' them to "work on small-scale, labour-intensive .invest-
ment projects. The Third Plan has allocated 5 per cent of its 
resources to this programme, most of which will be spent in 
rural.-areas. Thus the combined allocation to the rural sector 
will be 20 per cent or more, inasmuch as a considerable pro-
portion of the expenditure on. Water and Power should be agri-
culture. 
The allocation to education has been consistently low. 
This is one of the most serious weaknesses of the Third Plan 
and is discussed in more detail in a. later section of the 
essay. 
One of the politically most delicate problems in Pakis-
tan is the allocation of investment between the two wings. 
In 1963-64 it was estimated that the per capita income in 
West-Pakistan was about 27 per cent higher than in East 
Pakistan. A principal concern of the planners, in accordance 
with Article 145 of the Constitution, is the removal of this 
income disparity in the shortest possible time. It is a spe-
cific objective of the Perspective Plan to eliminate the 
disparity'by 1985. 
I11 the Third Plan the disparity is narrowed by project-
ing a 7 per cent -annual rate of growth for East Pakistan and 
a 6 per cent rate for West Paidstan. The investment alloca-
tions underlying these projections are: as follows: 
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TASLE IV 
THE REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT 
(Rs.million) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Public Investment lo.OOO 14,000 
Private Investment 11,000 11,000 
Total Investment 27,000 25,000 
Source: Third Five Year Plan, p.130 
It is expected that Rs. 2,000 million more will be in-
vested in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan.. This Is'to 
be achieved (a) by allocating 53 percent of public expendi-
ture to the east wing and (b) by assuming that private in-
vestment will be divided equally among the two Provinces. 
In fact, public expenditure in West Pakistan will be 
considerably higher than the data of the Planning Commission 
indicate. This is because the entire Indus Basin Works, the 
total cost of which is over $ 900 million, is excluded from 
the Plan. Once the Works are completed output and irtcoae in 
West Pakistan will substantially Increase and the income dis-
parity will widen. 
Similarly, the assumption about private investment is 
completely unrealistic. Priva„te investment in East Pakistan 
during the Second Plan period was Rs.3s300 million, whereas 
it was Rs.3^600 million in West Pakistan. During the Third 
Plan private investment In both wings suddenly is expected 
to become equal. Yet it is common knowledge that private In-
vestment is not only larger but also more dynamic in West 
Pakistan. The plan document itself includes several references 
to "the relative shyness of the private sector to invest in 
11/ 
this region", i.e. in East Pakistan. Thus there is virtually 
no likelihood that the east wing can achieve the private in-
vestment target set for it. 
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Income disparities, both in absolute and relative terras, 
are likely to increase during, the Third Plan. The anticipated 
achievements lin the plan. document are clearly an over-statement. 
As. such they may: have some propaganda value, but if the autho-
rities believe the planners' projections serious policy 
errors ? may be' caused, 
b) Indus t r i al i z a t ion 
Although industrial investment has gradually declined 
as a proportion of total development expenditure through the 
years of Pakistan's planning history, it has remained, 
throughout, the sector claiming the largest share. This will 
continue to be true in the Third Plan period, when the plan-
ners expect 26 per cent of the total to go to that sector— 
as compared to 28 per cent in the Second Plan period. The 
total expenditure of Rs... 12,880 million is to be divided 
54 per cent to 46 per cent in favour of the east wing. 
Although it was noted above £section Ill-a) that 
virtual equality was expected in private sector investment 
outlays (of all sorts) for the Third Plan period, the pro-
gram for industrial investment shows that the west x^ ing is 
to enjoy "an" 18 per cent advantage, while receiving less than 
12/ 
half as much of public industrial investment as East Pakistan. 
The breakdown of allocations is si-owns is shown in Table V. 
TABLE V 
REGIONAL ALLOCATION OP INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
EXPENDITURE FOR THE THIRD PLAN ffiRIOD 
(Rs.million) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan Total 
Public Sector 3100 1480 4580 
Private Sector 3S00 4500 83OO 
6900 5980 12,880 
Source: Third Five Year Plan,, p.474 rf 
Table VI shows the East-West breakdown by industry groups. 
Textile manufactures, basic metals, chemicals, and non-metallic 
mineral products are, in the order named, the most important 
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items on the list. These four account for half of total in-
tended industrial investment. Parity is maintained nicely o-
among these top four, with each wing "being allocated the 
larger share in two groups, and with the two wings coming out 
virtually even in total allocations to the four. As indicated 
in our earlier discussion, too much is expected of private • 
enterprise in the East Wing. In textiles, for example, all 
but Rs. 77 million of the East Wing's investment is to come 
from private sources, and in food (So per cent), petrochemi-
cals (6l per cent), non-metallic mineral'products (60 per 
cent), and transport equipment (45 per cent), the private 
sector is given a very large share to carry. 
^The allocations shown in Table VI do not Indicate that 
great strides are intended in the direction of the Plan's 
stated goal of shifting toxfard low-import, high-value-added 
capital goods production, although that Is scarcely sur-
prising, given the established pattern of Pakistani industry. 
TABLE IV 
INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY GROUPS 
(Rs. Million) 
Industry group East Pakistan West Pakistan Total 
Food manufacture 486 300 786 
Textiles lk-77 1000 2477 
Paper and products 534 100 634 
Chemical industries 885 585 1470 
Petrochemicals 376 450 826 
Non-metallic mineral 
products (cement) 419 56l 980 
Basic metals 44l 1105 1546 
Machinery, except electrical machinery 195 412 607 
Transport equipment ... I 556 144 700 
a/ 
Other •-•>•• 1531 1323 2854 
w 127SBH 
a._/ industries for which Third Plan expenditure 
totals less than Rs. 500 million 
Source: Third Five Year Plan, p.474 
- 15 -
Consumer goods such as food manufactures* textiles and paper 
account for thirty per cent of the total outlays.j 
According to the Plan, the criteria utilized in allocat-
ing these funds were the following1: (1) the balance of pay-
ments effect, (2) value added and return on capital, and, 
(3) the employment effect, i.In addition to these criteria 
there are several constraints and conditions. The planners 
choose to continue to place "major reliance" on private in-
i y 
vestment. The.Plan states that "Public industrial investment 
will be undertaken only in those cases where private capital 
is not forthcoming, where a joint venture cannot be organized 
or where considerations of national interest dictate public 
investment." Furthermore, concentration through industrial 
integration should be avoided, and (as already noted) the 
problem of disparity must be given paramount weight. w 
The plan states that investment will be sanctioned 
"by new procedures which will apply input/output analysis". 
Production targets are to be derived from an inter-industry 
model, from which, in turn, are derived investment targets. 
These targets (presumably modified in some way by application 
of the criteria and constraints discussed above) are then to 
be translated Into financial sanctions, in annual "Investment 
Schedules". 
- Prior to the Third Plan period, little effort was made 
to guide or coordinate investment: "it was left largely to 
the private sector to decide the direction of these invest-
ments ..... behind a protective shelter...." . In all 
probability, use of a programming model of any degree of 
sophistication and detail in investment sanctioning w^ .11 not 
get under way for some time yet. The "first step" in the pro-
cedure, in .the form of an outline based on a 5^-square inter-16/ 
•industry model, did not appear until late July, 19&5* ^hen 
the 1965/66 investment schedules were already in the process of 
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Casual procedure in allocation of investment was perhaps 
acceptable in the first two Plan periods, but the rapid trans-
formation of the economy which the Third Plan expects to occur 
makes greater precision! essential. The manufacturing sector 
contributed a little more than nine per cent of C-ross National 
Product in 1959/60 (the terminal year of the First Plan period), 
while in 1954/65, that proportion had risen to an estimated 
eleven per cent. Roughly that rate of transformation is expec-17/ 
ted to continue, so that by 1969/70, manufacturing will 
provide more than one-eighth of GNP. That sector looms larger 
still as a proportion of total investment (more than one-fourth), 
and In terms of the burnen which it is expected to carry in 
minimizing imports and expanding exports (see section Ill-e, 
below). .:!'•• 
The implied intention of the Plan, then, is to shift 
from an essentiallj7- un-planned industrial sector to a more 
explicitly regulated one, in time. A study under way at the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics x-d.ll. show that 
the correspondence between Investment Schedules and realized 
investment was non-existent during the Second Plan period, 
and that, although sanctions may have inhibited investment 
to some extent through administrative friction, they did not 
succeed in coordinating planning goals and performance. Given 
heavy reliance on private entrepreneurs and hea.vy subsidization 
through protection (and hence very ftgh profit rates), this 
result is scarcely surprising. It remains to be seen whether 
more integrated-planning can be accomplished itfhile nearly two-
thirds of total investment in Industry remains in private 
hands. . 
It is hoped that special attention will be given to the 
"value added and return on capital" criterion. Such evidence 
18/ 
as exists suggests that industry in Pakistan is very -in-
efficient and that its growth is being pushed at a high social 
cost. The gradual shift from plan-to-plan In favor of increasing 
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agriculture's share of development expenditure suggests a 
gradual realization of high returns in that sector, and is 
to he welcomed. Higher priority for investment in human re-
sources also seems clearly warranted (see section IV, below). 
In sum, the industrial sector, because of the dynamic 
response of entrepreneurs to high profits in protected markets, 
has been given the role of leading sector, without the social 
and economic costs having been carefully counted. As the plan-
ning system becomes more comprehensive and (hopefully) more 
rational, these costs, should become more explicit and alter-
native investments choices will be given heavier xveight. This 
will take time, however, as the Third Plan shows only the 
most modest inclinations in that direction, 
c) Agriculture 
Pakistan is no exception to the general pattern of under-
development so far as the role of agriculture is concerned. 
The burst of industrial growth in the country has tended to 
divert attention from the source of income of more than four-
fifths of the nation's people. However, agricultural produc-
tion staged a quite remarkable upsurge during the Second Plan 
period. After having failed to match population grotfth for more 
than a decade, farmers responded well to the combination of 
good weather, increased irrigation water supplies, and to 
increased availability of fertilizer and other non-conven-
tional inputs, with.the result that the sector's contribution 
to economic growth in the Second Plan period was (in absolute 
terms) more.than twice that of the much smaller industrial 
w 
secotr. 
While this surprise is a most encouraging one, it is re-
cognized by the planners to be an insufficient growth perform-
ance, and much more is expected of this vital sector for the 
next five years,. The' Plan for an over-all increase in agri-20/ 
cultural.output of five per cent per annum, which, if 
accomplished, will yield a rate of growth which would clearly 
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outstrip ulation growth for the first time in Pakistan's 
history. If this goal is missed by very much on the other 
hand, the Third Plan will surely fall short as a whole, for 
the agricultural growth increment is to be thirty-five per 
cent of the total increment—and will again have to bear a 
much larger absolute burden than manufacturing, even though 
the share of development expenditure allocated to agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries will remain well below that allocated 
to manufacturing (15.4 per cent vs. 26.1 per cent. ) It 
should be added, however, that this comparison of sectoral 
allocations given in the plan is somewhat misleading because 
of very substantial outlays to other "non-agricultural" sectors 
which contribute significantly to agricultural productivity— 
and probably more than to industry. Water and Power will 
receive virtually as largo an allocation (15.2 per cent) as 
agriculture proper, and the Public Works programme, which Is 
in large measure agriculture-connected, will receive 4.8 per 
cent of the total. Furthermore, the gigantic Indus Basin pro-
gramme will spend on the order of Rs. 2800 million in the Third 
Plan period, which (although outside the plan accounting) is 
more than five percent as large as the total Plan outlay. 
Thus, although industry is getting more than its "share", 
agricultural development is by no means being ignored. The general 
structure of public sector outlays for agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries (not including the Public Works programme, water 
development expenditures, or Indus Basin expenditures), is 
shown in Table VII. A summary of major crop growth goals Is 
given in Table VIII. 
The production goals shown In Table VIII represent signi-
ficant departures from Second Plan performance in the case of 
wheat and jute, particularly the latter. Inasmuch as jute and 
rice are competitive for acreage, the target shown here will 
require a shift of land use in East Pakistan of considerable 
size, along with a substantial increase in productivity in rice 
22/ 
- 19 -
culture. The optimism for cotton and wheat stems mainly from 
favorable expectations for irrigation water and fertilizer in 
West Pakistan plus seed improvement. 
TABLE VII 
ALLOCATION OP PUBLIC SECTOR OUTLAYS IN 
AGRICULTURE FOR THE THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN 
(Rs. million) 
Azad Kashmir 
East ..vJest " and Northern All 
Pakistan Pakistan Areas Pakistan 
Manure and fertilizer 484.20 : 677.70 5.28 1167.18 
Plant protection 341.17 300.07 1.25 642.49 
Mechanization 270.00 213.74 nil 483.74 
Food grain storage 188.30 67.67 nil 255.97 
Animal husbandry 101.80 111.78 3.59 217.17 
Forestry 150,00 196.40 13.14 359.54 
Fisheries 
S/ All other 
170.71 
549.66 
108.38 
700.34 
0.56 
11.69 
279.65 
1261.69 
2255.84 2376.08 35.51 4667.43 
a/ sectors receiving allocations of less than 
Rs. 200 million 
Source: Third. Five Year Plan* pp. 459-60 
TABLE VIII 
BENCHMARKS AND TARGETS OF CROP PRODUCTION FOR 
THE THIRD PLAN, SELECTED MAJOR CROPS 
Plan Plan Targets Increase, targets Increase 3rd 
Crop Benchmarks over benchmarks Plan bench-marks over 
2nd Plan 
| benchmarks ~(VhousancTonsj ~~ (per cent) 
Rice 11,400 14,44-5 27 36.7 
Wheat 4,157 5*464 31 12.3 
Sugar cane 20,750 28,300 36 34.5 
Jute 6,200 8,000 29 3.3 
Cotton 2,217 3,520 59 33.1 
a/ determined mainly on the basis of ten year 
linear trends 
Source: Third. Five Year Plan, pp.4lO,4l4. 
Wheat breeding experiments at the Agricultural University in 
Lyallpur have yielded remarkably good results with crosses 
between Mexican and indigenous strains. 
The Plan says little of a specific nature about the way 
in which agricultural growth will be divided between the two 
wings. It is stated however, that the division is to be, 
roughly, 5.5 per cent per annum in the West Wing and 4.5 per 23/ 
cent per annum in the East Wing. It seems likely that the 
discrepancy in growth rates will be greater than that. A study 
by two members of the Harvard University advisory team at the 
Planning Commission concludes that the agricultural sector of 
West Pakistan should grow by approximately 6.2 per cent per 24 / 
annum, given the inputs scheduled for that area in the Plan. 
On the other hand, any substantial acceleration of yields 
beyond that experienced in East Pakistan seems less than . 
likely, indeed, as we he„ve seen, the remarkable increase in 
rice production in the East Wing which appears in the official 
statistics seems difficult to explain. 
Land reform, which has failed to meet targets consistently 
in the past, is once again set with ambitious targets. There 
seems little possibility that the standards of minimum holdings 
can even be approximated. The Plan states that in East Pakis-
tan the minimum subsistence holdings should be from three to 
eight acres, depending on the quality of soil and wa„ter avail-
ability. However, East Pakistan has an agricultural population 
of at least fifty million persons on a total of 22 million 
cultivated acres. The latter would provide only a total 7.3 
million three acre plots if the land were equally distributed. 
That would mean nearly seven persons per plot. Seven persons 
per family may not be an unreasonable assumption for rural 
families in East Pakistan, but the assumption of equal dis-
tribution which is required to make the arable land go around 
is not only violently inconsistent with the known facts, but 
also with the stated ceiling on ownership (500 acres of irri-
gated land). 
The same sort of arithmetic can be applied, with the 
same conclusion, in West Pakistan. The West Wing subsistence 
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minimum is set at a range of 12.5 to 16 acres. But the Plan 
tells us that there are twelve million farmers in West Pakis-
tan on only 4l million acres of arable land, giving an average 
holding of only a little more than five acres. Consolidation 
of holdings, combined with cooperative farming, if enthu-
siatically pursued, might make the land-holding goals less 
reiiiote. The pace of that program in Pakistan is slow, however, 
and seems unlikely to prevent increased fragmentation of 
holdings in the near future, despite the legal sanctions. 
The hope for agriculture in Pakistan is based upon 
several encouraging factors: (1) the remarkably rapid deve-
lopment in West Pakistan of ground water by both private and 
public agents, (2) the anticipated Increase in the availa-
bility of surface water as the canal system Is improved, (3) 
the Public Works program, and (-'!-) the government commitment 
to meet all demand for fertilizer at subsidized prices. The 
remaining discussion will concentrate on (1) and (3), slighting 
the others for lack of spa,ce. 
The development of groundwater in West Pakistan, particu-
larly by private entrepreneurs, has been quite as spectacular 
as the dynamism of private industrial entrepreneurs. During 
the Second Plan period, private installation of tubewells 
accelerated so rapidly that many' informed observers were 
taken quite unaware. By the end of the Plan period, private 
installations wore going in at the rate of 6500 per annum; and 
estimates of private tubewells operating in West Pakistan in 
25/ 
1965 run as high as 32,000. These wells are estimated to 
have provided 4.7 million acre feet of irrigation water, and 
to have contirubted about half of the increase in productivi-26/ 5 
ty of the second plan period in the West Wing. 
This b .rst of activity in mining the vast aquifer under-
lying the Indus Plain has by no means exhausted itself, and, 
given adequate public policy to allow it, it can be expected 
to continue, or even to accelerate in the Third Plan period. 
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27/ Ultimate groundwater potential is estimated to be as high 
as forty million acre feet, while not more than eight million 
are now accessible with public and private well capacity com-
bined. An additional 40,000 private tubewells plus nearly 12,000 
new public wells will (if estimates and plans are realized) 
provide more than seventeen million acre feet during the 
Third Plan period. This improvement, combined with the pro-
bable surface water Increase, could yield as much as a 32 per 
cent increase in "field availability" of water by the end of 
28/ 
the Third Plan period. 
In spite of the fact that only half of the planned allo-
cation for the Public Works programme was actually utilized 
during the Second Plan period, its success, in East Pakistan 
particularly, has led the planners to call for a program 
outlay in the Third Plan period which is more than three times 
the size of that realized in the earlier period (Rs. 2500 
million are to be expended). The importance of this program 
may be understated by the size of that outlay, which is less 
than five per cent of total development outlays. Given estimates 
of overt and seasonal unemployment in excess of twenty per 
cent of the total labor supply, efforts to utilize this large-
ly untapped potential in creating capital (largely in the 
form of roads and earthworks) seems eminently desirable. Not 
only is the increased employment socially desirable, but the 
improvement in transportation and water control facilities 
may very well be crucial. East Pakistan's flood control prob-
lems and West Pakistan's drainage problems are obvious can-
didates for experimentation with labor intensive techniques. 
Supported as they are by the inflation cushion of P.L. 480 
imports, the Public Works programmes already, in their short 
history, appear to have made a contribution to agricultural 2g/ 
productivity, without serious agricultural price increases. 
In sum, agriculture, particularly in West Pakistan, 
shows promise of fulfilling the planners hopes. The hazards 
are manifold, however, and too little is being done in a co-
ordinated way to counteract (a) waterlogging and salinity in 
the Indus Plain, (b) flooding in East P aids tan, (c) the un-
seasonal ity of water supply in East Pakistan, (d) the lovr 
level of technical training in agriculture, and (e) further 
fragmentation of agricultural plots of uneconomic size. Quite 
conceivably, a greater concentration of resources in these 
areas could yield substantial net dividends. 
30/ 
d) The Balance of Payments 
Pakistan's goals in international trade and finance are 
ambitious in the Second Plan period, foreign exchange earnings 31/ 
were Rs. 13>252 million. They are planned at Rs.20,000 for 
the next five years. At the same time, foreign exchange re-
quirements are to grow (absolutely speaking) even more than 
earnings. Total international payments by Pakistan during 32/ the Second Plan period \;ere an estimated Rs.21,260 millions. 
In the Third Plan period they are expected by the planners to 
33/ 
be Rs. 35,500 million. The Government of Pakistan has 
chosen to attempt to close the widening gap by increasing 
both export earnings and foreign assistance. However, the 
Plan strategy ca,lls for on acceleration of Pakistan's own 
earnings to a rate of growth greater than that of foreign aid, 
so as to end the plan period with a reduced proportional 
weight of reliance on other nations. 
The Third Plan document chooses to put the Balance of 
Payments problems in a favourable light. The Plan states: 
"One of the outstanding features of the Second Plan 
has been its success in stabilizing and improving 
the balance of payments situation in the country. 
Export earnings have been higher than the Plan 
estimate, import requirements have been less than 
originally projected and the country has been able 
to exceed the investment targets of the Plan with-
out requiring as much external assistance as was 
anticipated earlier. This improvement must be 
consolidated and accelerated during the Third 
Plan". 3 V 
This is a remarkable statement because of what it fails 
to say.' Although it is true that the Second Plan exceeded 
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balance of payments goals, the goals themselves were modest. 
The performance of the international sector of the economy 
over the past five years cannot be considered one of improve-
ment in any more relevant sense. The gap between the country's 
foreign exchange earnings and payments for imports grow, both 
in absolute terms, and as a proportion of Gross National Pro-
duct. In the Third Plan period, the absolute growth of the 
gap will continue, but as a proportion of GNP it will, if the 
Plan succeeds in this respect, fall back to the proportion 
which obtained at the cutset of the Second Plan period, or 
slightly less than that. 
The basic requirement.;of this strategy is that the volume 
and value of exports be markedly increased absolutely, and 
relative to total output. The targets chosen require a com-
pound annual growth rate for exports of approximately nine 
and one-half per cent, as compared to a projected GNP goa.1 
of six end one-half per cent for the same period. At the same 
tine, smaller proportions of total foreign earnings are to be 
derived from exports of the traditional primary goods, raw 
cotton and raw jute, in particular. This places a heavy 
burden on the rapidly growing manufacturing sector. It calls 
for an increase in that sector's export earnings of 145 por 
cent over the plan period, or nearly twenty per cent per 35/ 
annum. 
In view of Second Plan performance, this seems to be 
overly 1 ambitious. The Second Plan rate of growth of export 
earnings exceeded the target primarily because of a sudden 
recovery in cotton exports in 1962/63 and because of the 
continuation of the rapid growth of earnings from invisibles. 
In no year other than 1962/63 did merchandise export growth 
re'ach the achieved overall Plan period average| and only 36/ 
twice was the Second. Plan's growth rate goal exceeded. 
These uncertain fluctuations suggest that the Second Plan 
performance in exports is an extremely shaky base from which 
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to project—and particularly shaky for projecting an accele-
ration. The manufacturing sector was not able to increase 
exports as a proportion of output in the Second Plan period; 
on the contrary there appears to have been negative import 
substitution in recent years in that area. More hope may be 
gained from further expansion of exports of cotton and cotton 
manufactures, as the agricultural boom in the former Punjab 
makes itself felt. 
Curtailment of the rate of growth of imports must be 
even more drastic than the export push, if this Plan's targets 
are to be met. International payments grew by almost sixteen . 
per cent per annum over the past five years, while the Plan. 
calls for less than half that rate over the next five. The 
cut is to be particularly marked in the Import of "development 
imports" (mainly capital goods), even though the plan calls 
for an overall rise in the capital-output ratio. It seems 
doubtful that this goal can be consistent with a further acce-
leration in the rate of growth of large-scale manufacturing 
(from thirteen per cent per annum to fifteen per cent or 
more). 
According to the Plan, import requirements were estima-
ted using input-output analysis, although It concedes that the 
projected requirements "irjhe been adjusted on the basis of 
targets of import substitution". Given the anticipated expan-
sion of industrial output vis-a-vis ether sectors, one would 
expect linear projections to yield rising import requirements-
probably even with substantial import substitution taken into 
consideration. Investigation discloses that the model used 
was in fact not linear, due to aggregation of sectors of 
changing composition, and that it yields declining import 
growth rates net of substitution. Substitution lowers these 
rates still further, and it is conceded within the Planning 
Commission that the assumptions of the Plan document concern-
ing import substitution c.re arbitrary and probably unrealistic, 
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particularly in capital goods. The entire exercise seems biased 
on the optimistic side and should be carefully re-examined 
before any heavy reliance is placed on the projections in policy-
making . 
The policies which are expected to induce the improve-
ments described are not dramatic changes from the past, although 
the shift in performance called for would seem to demand it. 
Commercial policy in recent years has been liberalized as much 
as limits of foreign exchange would allow. Substantial increases 
in "commodity aid" (which is used primarily to import raw 
materials and spare parts) have been utilized to establish a 
"free list" of imports, for which there are ostensibly no 
restrictions. Other aspects of the complex foreign exchange 
licensing system have been streamlined and simplified to make 
Importation easier, as well. Much of this liberalization has 
been directljr connected with expert promotion, thus, building 
a kind of circularity into commercial policy. Unfortunately, .i:• 
"its impact on imports seems to have been significantly'greater 
than on exports; hence the continued widening of the trade 
22/ 
gap. The Plan's expressed satisfaction x^ ith these policies 
suggests an unawareness of the need for fairly strong measures 
that go with the ambitious balance of payments goals. 
Freer imports of manufacturing inputs do appear to have 
induced better capacity utilization* particularly in the 
metal-using industries. However, thejr have apparently been 
unable to bring the premium on foreign exchange down tc a 
neighborhood of maket equilibrium, as desired. To succeed in 
this aim, imports plus domestic production would have to be •" 
increased at a rate greater then the rapid rise of total denand--
— a treadmill operation. 
Tariff protection of domestic industry, particularly pr 
producers of consumer goods, remains very high, despite evi-32/ 
dence of extreme and general inefficiency. The Plan's pro-
posal to extend this high implicit subsidy to intermediate and 
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capital goods industries^ despite an already high profit rate 
In this area, seems ill-advised. Industrialization "by sub-
sidization should have its limits, infant industries argu-
ments notwithstanding. In sum, commercial policy in Pakistan 
appears to be Inadequate to meet the tasks set for it. 
At the time of this writing, Pakistan's foreign aid pic-
ture is seriously clouded by a diplomatic crisis over the 
postponement of this year's meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan 
Consortium. Given the Plan strategy, settlement of that 
crisis is essential, for a large and consistent flow of 
foreign economic assistance is central to the Plan. It is 
estimated that external resource requirements will be Rs.15,500 
million, or thirty-two per cent of the "total resources" (i.e., 
resources, for development purposes) expected to be utilized 
during the Plan period. This Is an understatement, incidentally, 
for aid for the Indus Basin works and Public Law 480 imports 
(U.S. surpluses) are excluded from the accounting. All things 
included, external resources become more important than either 
private or public domestic sources of development expenditure 
for the Third Plan period. Total aid must average nearly S800 
million per year, or more than $7 per capita. 
Although the plan concedes great dependence on aid, it 
may have understated requirements, as already suggested im-
plicitly in our discussion of export earnings and import 
requirements, above. Furthermore, the phasing of aid utiliza-
tion in the plan calls for a slowdown in utilization, though 
recent experience shows a very marked increase. The Plan does 
take account of the normal increase in \itilization as pro-
jects mature, but a check of its projection phasing pattern 
shows it to be inconsistent with recent performance. 
The Plan's discussion of the balance of payments and 
internal resources treats the entire problem as though the 
two wings of this geographically divided nation were one. 
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This is a serious flaw, for East Pakistan, with very consie . 
derable foreign exchange earning capability, receives (and 
apparently can absorb) much less than half of the total 
supply of foreign resources, while West Pakistan, with in-
sufficient capacity to earn what she needs in the way of 
foreign exchange, takes the larger share. Inter-wing parity is 
a stated goal, but the means of its achievement in the inter-
national sector are not sketched for us beyond the most ge-
neral statements of intention to favor the East Wing with in-
vestment policy—which presumably implies a rising share of 
the nation's total imports. On the other hand, the West is 
the industrial Wing, and should exports of manufactures be 
increased as planned, balance on the West side should be a 
much nearer goal1970. Our reservations on that matter, 
however, have already been stated. 
IV. Human Resources. 
a) Educational Objectives 
The planners have recognized that education is "a vital 
national investment and a major determinant of the Nation's 
W 
economic growth". The absolute expenditure on education 
in the Second Plan was nearly five times larger than in the 
First, and it is anticipated that expenditure will increase 
by 2 1/2 times again during the Third Plan. On the surface 
this is an encouraging development. On the other hand, al-
though the proportionate expenditure on education in the 
Third Plan is higher than in the Second, it is not as high as 
it was in the First Plan and is no higher than it was in the 
Pre-Plan period (1950-55). 
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TABLE IX 
RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Rs. Million' As percentage of 
Development 
Expenditure 
Pre-Plan (1950-55) 
First Plan (1955-60) 
Second Plan (1960-65) 
Third Flan (1965-70) 
1102 
2730 
230 
5 
4 
5 
Source: Col (1): Third Plan, p.219; 
Col (2): Ibid, p. 49 
Moreover> even in absolute terras the annual per capita 
expenditure on education during the Third Plan will only be 
about Rs. 51 According to the latest census there were rou 
24.5 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 in 19SI. 
At the same time only 4.3 million children were enrolled in 
schools. That is, less that 1/5 of the children of school 
age were actually registered at educational institutions. Even 
this figure may be an overestimate, however, as there is 
reason to believe that schools inflate the numbsr of students 
enrolled in order to receive higher grants or attract more 
student's. 
Approximately 85 percent of the population is illi-
terate. This high proportion is attributable not only to an 
inusfficiency of educational facilities but also to their 
low quality. As a result of the latter the drop-out rate . 
is very high and the number of students in secondary schools 
is less than 30 percent of the number enrolled in primary 
schools. Evidently there are many children who are poorly 
trained and who are functionally illiterate even though they 
may not be so classified in census data. The planners' intention 
"to reduce the rate of drop-out by improving the quality of 
education offered" constitutes official recognition of this 
44/ 
problem. 
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The plan's strategy for education was prepared without 
the aid of a detailed manpower survey. Thus the educational 
authorities did not know the number of trained persons in 
various categories which exists, the extent of present short-
ages in these categories, nor even future requirements. One 
would have thought that such information would have been ge-
nerated after ten years of planning, but it was not. Manpower 
surveys, however., now are reported to be underway. 
Due to this lack of basic data the educational programme 
necessarily reflects the a priori views of the planners and any 
fragmentary evidence which is available, including information 
from other countries. These factors apparently led them 
to believe that "the keynote of the Third Plan" should be 
46/ 
"quality education". This priority apparently reflects 
official concern about the widely acknowledged deterioration 
of the educational system in Pakistan since independence. In 
addition they are concerned with "widening the base of primary 
education and greatly increasing the facilities for technical w 
and vocational education. 
An examination of the proportional distribution of ex-
penditure among the various educational categories is one 
(fairly crude) method of checking whether resource alloca-
tion reflects the stated plan priorities. 
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TABLE X 
RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
(in percentages) 
First Plan Second Plan Third Plan 
Primary education 20 9 20 
Secondary education 19 17 23 
Higher education 26 25 15 
Technical education 6 24 23 
Teacher education : 2 6 5 
Scholarships 1 8 8 ; 
Miscellaneous 26 11 .r ,5 
100 100 100 
Source : Third Five Year Plan, p. 219 
The most direct source of qualitative improvements 
vrould he through (a) curriculum reforms, (b) the provision 
of more and better teachers, and (c) the adoption of proce-
dures which enable the most talented students to advance to 
higher levels. With respect to (a) the Plan admits that 
"secondary education is in need of fundamental reorientation 
of its curriculum" and advocates a special emphasis, at all 
levels, on science and mathematics. If these curriculum re-
forms are in fact introduced there is little doubt that the 
quality of the existing educational system would improve. 
The data in Table X, on the other hand, appear to indicate 
that teacher training has a slightly lower priority in the 
Third Plan than it enjoyed in the Second—although the abso-
lute expenditure has nearly doubled because the total edu-
cation budget is so much larger. Similarly, the proportional 
allocation to scholarships—the third source of a rise in 
quality—is unchanged from the Second Plan. Thus the overall 
impression one has from these data on anticipated expendi-
ture is that there has been no special emphasis on quality 
education within the Third Plan, i.e., in this respect there 
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does not appe-ar to have been a pronounced shift of strategy. 
In comparison with the Second Plan the priority assigned 
w 
to primary education (as well as secondary education) has 
greatly increased. This appears to have come at the expense 
of expenditure on higher education and is to be x^ elcomed. 
It should be noted, however, that the proportion allocated 
to primary schooling in the Third Plan is identical to that 
allocated in the First, and hence primary education has only 
been restored to the relative importance it previously en-
joyed, Finally, expenditure on technical education is rela-
tively lonrer in the Third Plan than in the Second and its 
decline of one percentage point would appear to be incon-
sistent xtfith the stated priorities. 
The analysis so far has remained within the context 
of the stated objectives and expenditure allocations of the 
Plan. The strat**gy itself has not been questioned. Yet one 
cannot help but feel that in a country where over 85 percent 
of the population lives in rural areas and where nearlj 50 
percent of the output is generated in agriculture top 
priority ought to be assigned, to agricultural training. The 
needs for skilled labour and. professional manpower in the 
urban sector constitute a very small fraction of the work 
force. The need for trained farmers, hox-irever, is immense. An 
adequate scheme of rural education would greatly facilitate 
--if it is not an essential requirement for—the success of 
any development programme which hopes to transform the country-
side by, say, introducing unconventional inputs and creating 
new rural institutions and land tenure relationships. 
In Pakistan there is a "pronounced hiatus" between the 
educational facilities available in the urban and rural com-• 50/ •••• -
raunities. In fact, agricultural education has been almost 
completely neglected. In 1960-Sl there were only 2402 students 51/' 
studying agriculture in the whole of Pakistan. This re-
presented only .04 per cent of the entire students population 
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or 1.6 per cent of the students above the secondary level.. 
This neglect is perpetuated in the Third Plan. Only one pa-
ragraph in the document is devoted to rural education. This 
is found under Section G of the "Miscellaneous" category-
after Section E—Physical Education and Section F—Juvenile 
Literature. 
In summary, it appears that (i) total expenditure on 
education is inadequate, (ii) the allocation of expenditure 
within the various educational categories does not closely 
reflect the stated plan priorities, and (iii) the priorities 
are not appropriate to the needs for social and economic de-
velopment In Pakistan. A great more emphasis should be placed o. 
on rural education. Tho educational programme is one of the 
most glaring weaknesses of the Third Five Year Plan and 
raises serious questions about the ability of the economy to 
achieve the global objectives set for .it. 
b) Manpower and Employment 
Labor force data in Pakistan are largely speculative. 
The 1964/65 Pakistan Economic Survey devotes a scant two 
paragraphs to manpower planning, a fair proportion of the 
space being occupied by the following statement: "There are 
no adequate and consistent statistical series available on 
the labour force and employment for analysis of changes in 
5i/ 
trends" 
In spite of this lack of information, the Third Five 
Year Plan and the Evaluation of the Second Plan conclude that 
manpower utilization in the Second Plan period did not do 
better than to keep pace with tho growth of the labour force, 
although the arithmetic of growth would suggest that they 
have most likely done better than that. 
An economy' growing at an overall rate of 5.2 pc-r cent 
per annum with a population growth rate of something on the 53/ 
order of 2.5 per cent per annum should be generating jobs 
mote rapidly than the rate at which new persons enter the 
- 34 -
labor 2force. If wo assume that the participation rate changed 
54/ 
very little over the Plan period, keeping even on employ-
ment would imply a labor productivity increase of 2.6 per 
cent per annum. Even though high rates of growth in produc-
tivity are quite plausible, given the very low base, it seems 
unlikely that pakis tan would outstrip the United States in 55/ 
this regard, as these figures imply. If, on the other 
hand this apparent phenomenon is real, the country's growth 
strategy should be carefully examined to see whether or not 
it is sufficiently labor Intensive at the margin. 
The projections for the Third Plan raise the same ques- '• 
tions, with greater force. The Plan's labor force data are re-
produced in Table XI. As the table shows, the planners expect 
the supply of manpower to grow by only 4.2 million man years, 
or thirteen per cent overall. Population, according to the 
most conservative estimates, will grow by more than thirteen per 
cent, and, if anything, the participation rate should increase, 
given the youth of the community. Hence an increase of man 
years supplied of 5.6 to 6.0 million would net seem implau-
sible. However, the Plan promises to provide only 5.5 million 
manyears of new employment, despite a projected overall pro-
duction growth rate of 6.5 per cent, an assumed population 
growth rate of only 2.6 per cent per annum, and an implicit 
decline In the participation rate. The implied productivity 
increase is more than 2.9 per cent ^ >er annum! 
Of course "productivity" change measured in this way is 
nothing more than a reflection of the change in the output-
labor ratio,, and may simply bo a result of (a) poor labor 
statistics (which we know we have) and/or (b) rise in the 56/ 
capital-output ratio (rhich the Plan predicts). Some in-
crease in the overall efficiency of production (i.e., output 
per unit of input), particularly in agriculture, is also 
quite plausible. Insofar as the shift is real and not illusory 
(i.e. due to poor data), it is to be hoped that it reflects 
- 35 -
TABLE XI 
LABOR FORCE, 1365 and 1970 
(million manyears) 
1965 1Q70 
East Pakistan 21.0 23.6 
West Pakistan 16.2 17.3 
' Total 37.2 41.4 
Source: Third Five Year Plan, p. 222 
greater returns directly attributable to labor inputs rather 
than substitution of capital inputs for labor inputs. Given 
the pattern of investment allocation and of subsidy, one 
fears, however, that the latter has been the case . to an 
extent which is undesirable economically in a labor surplus 
economy. 
It is particularly disturbing' to note that only 2.5 
million iaanyears of employment are to be created in tho agri-
57/ cultural sector. The rural population of Pakistan will grow, 
• 1 . V, 
in the Third Plan period, by approximately thirteen million 
58/ 
persons. Assuming," conservatively, a participation rate in 
the rural sector of thirty-two per cent, the rural labor 
force will grow by 4.2 million (equal to the Plan's estimated 
total labor force increase). This would increase rural un-
employment by 1.7 iaanyears—minus whatever increase in non-
agricultural employment takes place in rural areas. 
The same calculations applied to the urban sector show 
that the remaining (non-agricultural) jobs which are to be 
created will be more than enough to take care of the pro-
jected urban labor force. The net reduction in urban unem-
ployment would be on the order of 300,000, while there would 
be a not overall increase In unemployment (or underutilization) 
of-1.4 million manyears. 
Increase during 
Third Plan 
4.2 
TABLE XII 
PROJECTIONS OF SECTORAL CHANGES IN THE LABOR FORCE 
1965-70, AND THIRD PLAN ESTIMATES OF MANPOWER 
REQUIREMENTS 
(millions) 
(1) ^ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sector Population • Population Growth Labor Force 3rcl Plan Balance 
1965 1970 1965-70 Growth^/ Require- (4)-(5) 
nents 
Rural 95.1 108.7 12.6 4.2 2.5 -1-7 
Urban 15.9 21.3 5-4 1.7 2.0 0.3 
a/ assuming 32 per cent participation rate in both sectors 
Source: Population: totals are from estimate for 1963/64 
in Pakistan Economic Survey, p.2 projected at 
2.6 per cent to 1965, and at 3.0 per cent to 1970. 
Sector totals: calculated by applying linear projections 
• of inter-censal changes in the proportions 
in the two sectors. See Ibid, Statistical 
Appendix Table 3. 
This pessimistic ccnslusicn can be modified, however, if 
more realistic assumptions about manpower requirements are 
made than those, in the Plan. If no more than two per cent of 
the 6.5 per cent per annum Third Plan growth rate were to be 
accounted fcr by the rise of the output-labor ratio, 4.5 percent 
would remain as job-creating growth. Given constant or gently 
changing participation ratios, then, the (roughly) 3-0 per 
cent per annum growth of the labor force would be absorbed 
and an additional 1.5 per cent of the labor force would be 
in demand. The latter would be cumulative and growing in-
crement, so that by 1970 (assuming the Plan's 1965 labor 
force figure of 37.2 million to be correct, total demand for 
labor will have increased by 9.2 million, while the labor 
force will have increased by 5.9 million. Thus, 3.3 million 
additional man-years of employment demand will have boon 
created. This, in turn, would mean a reduction In the re-
servoir of unemployment and underemployment by 44 per cent— 
59/ labor mobility permitting. 
60/ 
The Plan states that it would take a great effort at 
labor intensification to bring about a better performance than 
the creation of 5.5 million additional man-years of jobs. 
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However, projections assume a continued decline in the ratio 
of labor to output, at a vigorous rate—although It nay in-
volve a slewing down of the rate of substitution of non-labor 
for labor inputs. Surely the latter Is within the power of 
economic policy, without there being any need for "an inten-
sive research programme to develop non-western labor intensive 
61/ 
production techniques , < however valuable such a program 
might be. Given the capital deepening which the Plan implicitl 
intends, the modest target for reduction of unemployment will 
probably not be met. This is primarily because the assumed rat 
of growth of the labor force is very low, and secondly because 
the output goals may be overly optimistic. 
The preceding discussion has focussed entirely on the 
quite crude considerations of macroeccnomic manpower demand. 
Quality of manpower is at least as important as quantity. 
Productivity increases that stem from improved skill and train 
ing are complementary and not competitive in making labor 52/ 
employable. Although the Plan is able to list a large num-
ber of training institutions, it is generally accepted as a 
fact that far too little in the way of resources for develop-
ment of human resource is being allocated. As cur discussion 
in section IV-a,has shr.'n, this shortcoming is particularly 
pronounced in the rural area—where labor underutilization is 
most serious. Surely the Soviet and Chinese example bf wide-
spread basic training in industrial and' agricultural techno-
logy deserves emulation in Pakistan, where .rudinentary 
expertise In production is such a scarce commodity, 
c) Family Planning 
According to the Pirn the population of Pakistan is about £3/ 
112 million, 45 percent of whom are below fifteen years of 
age. The current birth rate Is 55 per 1000 and the death rate 
is thought to bo about 2$. If the letter figure is correct 
the population is growing at 2.5 per cent per annum. Many de-
mographers, however, believe the growth rate Is higher, viz., 
about 3 per cent. According to the Perspective Plan the mor-
tality rate is expected to decline to about 15 per 1000 by 
1985. If, meanwhile, the fertility rate remains unchanged the 
rate of growth of population will accelerate to h per cent 
per annum. This is the spectre that haunts the nation. 
To prevent an expanding population from literally eat-
ing up all the projected increase in output tho Government ha 
begun an ambitious birth control programme. Tho objective of 
the programme is to reduce tho birth rate from 55 to 35 per 
1000 by 1985. The population projections of the Perspective 
Plan visualize an accelerating growth rate through 1970-75 fro 
2.5 per cent per annum to 2.8 per cent and then a sharp de-
celeration to 2.1 per cent during 1980-85. 
The family planning programme so far has been a disap-
pointment. Only Rs, 500 thousand were allocated to family 
planning in the First Plan. The amount was increased to 
Rs.30.5 million in the Second, but only half the allocation 
was actually spent. The programme . has just been reorganized, 
however, and a. Family Planning Commissioner in charge of a 
Division in the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Welfare 
has been established. The work of the Commissioner has the 
active support of the President. 
The specific target of the Third Five Year Plan is 
going to be very difficult to achieve—viz., to reduce the 
birth rate by 10 per 1000. Rs. 166 million have been alloca-
ted to achieve this. 
Beth the intra-uterine devices (I.U.D.) as well as tra-
ditional contraceptives (condoms, foam tablets, diaphgrams, 
etc.) will be supplied and sold at highly subsidized prices. 
Major emphasis, however, will be placed on the femer as 
the I.U.D.'s are cheaper, simpler and more effective. One 
would have thought, in fact, that tho traditional contracep-
tives could be neglected entirely* This would both simplify 
the organization of the programme and save money. 
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A prominent feature of the family planning scheme In 
Pakistan "is the monetary incentive.it offers both to those 
who practice contraception ancl to the personnel who pro"oa- • 
64/ ' 
gate it" For each vasectomy both the doctor and the client 
will be -:.paid Rs. 25. "insertion of I.U.D.'s will be free for 
tho client. For each insertion doctors will be paid Rs. 8/- and 
trained nurses/midwives/"dais" Rs. 4/-. Besides, "dais" will 
be paid Rs. 2.50 and others Rs. 2 for referring cases loading 
to insertion. Contraceptives will be sold at subsidized rates 
and 50 per cent of the sales proceeds will go as commission 65/ 
to the sellers". Quite clearly, those who participate in 
the programme are given a very strong financial incentive 
to work for its success. 
V. Conclusion 
Optimism in proper dosage is good medicine for a deve-
loping nation such as Pakistan. The preceding discussion •.> 
suggests, however, that the Planning Commission has been too 
much influenced by the good fortune of the middle years of 
the Second Plan period and ha,s generated optimistic growth 
goals for tho next five years largely through extrapolation 
of growth acceleration. There is no doubt that there is growth 
impetus in the economy, but the assumption that its accele-
ration will continue without policy shifts in almost all 
areas seems unwarranted. 
The power of the State's fiscal system seems seriously 
under-utilized, and only very mild strengthening in this area 
is proposed. The private corporate entrepreneur is to be 
relied upon to generate the largest part of a very high mar-
ginal rate of saving—as well as to generate the largest part 
of the increase in exportable surplus; this even while re-
ducing his import requirements drastically. Clearly too much 
reliance is being placed on the small, quite inefficient 
(though admittedly.dynamic) industrial sector. 
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The dynamism of that sector is not "being purchased 
without a price. The price is a very large inflow of largely 
foreign and East Wing financial capital goods (imported at 
favourable prices due to currency over-valuation), which arc-
being used to produce goods sold at prices very far above 
world market prices. The profits thus generated have been 
largely re-invested (most estimates range from sixty per 
cent to seventy-five per cent). The economic value of that 
reinvestment, however, is largely unquestioned, in terms of 
its net contribution to social value added, its impact on the 
distribution of income, or on employment. 
Agriculture, on the other hand, as is so frequently the 
case, is a poor, relatively unspectacular cousin. Pakistani 
farmers have made a substantial contribution to the nation's 
growth, and appear to have the potential for much more. If 
agricultural exporters received something approaching the 
scarcity value of the foreign exchange they earn, and if in-
dustrial entrepreneurs were required to pay something ap-
proaching the scarcity value of the foreign exchange which 
they use, the balance of the growth pattern would be shifted 
in a direction which, in our opinion, would be most healthy, 
particularly if accompanied by strengthening of the fiscal 
system. 
A larger effort for the rural community, in general, 
seems called for. West Pakistan, in particular, has great 
agricultural growth potential. It seems obvious that the time 
must come when relatively well-endowed West Pakistan will pro-
duce a surplus of resources which can be transferred to the 
underprivileged East Wing—rather than the other way around, 
as is now the case. This can probably not be accomplished by 
investing foreign exchange earned by East Pakistani farmers 
in industrial complexes in West Pakistan. Industry is a net 
foreign exchange user, and will most likely continue to be, 
in spite of the Plan's optimistic predictions. Foreign aid 
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can keep this process going in the short run, but in the •. 
longer run the surplus which agriculture can produce must 
be developed and tapped for productive investment. 
Still, agriculture's value is reflected in the Plan 
allocations, even if imperfectly. The great and obvious 
shortcoming of the Plan Is the inadequacy of its provision 
for the development of human resources. Education in Pakis-
tan is in a very bad state, by everyone's admission, both 
quantitatively and (perhaps more seriously) qualitatively. 
The nation needs thousands of young people who understand 
basic technology—in both agriculture and industry, parti-
cularly the former. Even so, the nation resists education 
reform with amazing stubbornness. Surely no type of invest-
ment deserves higher priority. 
Family planning seems to be on the verge of being given 
a major boost. It, too, is sorely needed, for the most recent 
estimates of rates of natural growth are frighteningly high. 
Also, the planned expansion of the Public Works Programme 
is a most encouraging development. It should be pushed with 
great vigor, taking fullest advantage of the availability of 
U.S. agricultural surpluses. 
Pakistan's Third Plan could succeed if appropriate 
measures were taken to insure it. The Plan document, as it 
exists, however, appears too weak as a statement of economic 
policy to make the present authors optimistic for the degree 
of success which the planners predict. 
Karachi 
August, 1965. 
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